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I. INTRODUCTION
When is a whistleblower not a “whistleblower?” The Supreme
Court will address this very question in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v.
Somers.1 The Court will examine the issue of whether an employee who
reports internally about violations of the securities laws, but does not
report the violation to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),
qualifies as a whistleblower under the anti-retaliation provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(“Dodd-Frank”).2 The Court granted certiorari in Digital Realty Trust to
resolve a split between the federal Courts of Appeal concerning the
proper application of the definition of “whistleblower” under Section
21F, “Whistleblower Incentives and Protection,” of Dodd-Frank to the
statute’s anti-retaliation provisions. At issue is subsection 21F(a)(6),
which defines whistleblower to mean any individual who provides
information regarding securities violations to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and subsection 21F(h)(A)(iii) of the
anti-retaliation provisions, which cross references the relevant provisions
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”),3 which does not
require external reporting to the SEC.4
In Digital Realty Trust, Paul Somers, a vice president of portfolio
management, filed suit under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions,
against his employer, Digital Realty Trust, Inc., a publicly traded realestate investment trust company, and a senior vice president for human
resources.5 Somers alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for
reporting to Digital Realty’s senior management that his supervisor had
engaged in certain corporate actions in violation of Sarbanes-Oxley. The
district court denied Digital Realty’s motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, rejecting Digital’s assertion that the anti-retaliation provision
under Dodd-Frank did not apply to this case because Somers was not a
whistleblower under the meaning of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
provision since he did not report the alleged conduct to the SEC.6
Recognizing a split in authority, the district court certified its order for
interlocutory review.7 After granting interlocutory review, a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
1
Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted,
137 S. Ct. 2300 (mem.) (June 26, 2017) (No. 16-1276).
2
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(21F).
3
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
4
§ 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002).
5
Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
6
Id. at 1092.
7
Id. at 1108.
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court’s decision.8
Concluding that the statutory definition of
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank was not dispositive, the Ninth Circuit
ultimately decided that Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision provides
protection to those employees who report to the SEC and who report
internally under Sarbanes-Oxley and other federal laws.9 The Supreme
Court granted Digital Realty’s petition for a writ of certiorari, to resolve
what Digital Realty asserted was “a clear and intractable conflict on an
important and recurring question of statutory interpretation.”10
Until recently, the Supreme Court had not addressed the scope of the
anti-retaliation provisions under Dodd-Frank. However, as discussed
below, the circuit courts had dealt with this issue with varying results.
The Fifth Circuit, in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), held that the antiretaliation provision of Dodd-Frank creates a private cause of action only
for those employees who make their disclosure to the SEC.11 The
plaintiff did not seek certiorari in that case. In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy,12
the Second Circuit, finding Chevron deference appropriate, held that the
Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions extended to employees who did
not submit their complaint to the SEC, but instead reported violations
internally or to another governmental authority. The defendant in
Berman also declined to seek certiorari.13 More recently, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in a Sixth Circuit case, Verble v. Morgan Stanley
Smith Barney.14 In that case, the Sixth Circuit granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss an alleged retaliation claim on the grounds that the
employee failed to state sufficient facts for a “plausible claim for relief”
under Dodd-Frank.15 The Sixth Circuit did not reach the interpretive
question concerning the definition of whistleblower. 16 In Digital Realty
Trust, the Supreme Court is expected to resolve the circuit split, and may
ultimately provide clarity for whistleblowers and employers regarding
the meaning of “whistleblower” under the definitional section of 21F of

8

Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1049.
10
Brief for the Petitioner on petition for certiorari at 2, Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers,
16-1276, August 24, 2017.
11
Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
12
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 145 (2d Cir. 2015).
13
Aaron Vehling, Dodd Frank Whistleblower Battle Won’t Hit High Court, LAW 360
(Nov. 12, 2015, 7:18 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/726167/
dodd-frank-whistleblower-battle-won-t-hit-the-high-court.
14
Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 644 (E.D. Tenn.
2015), aff’d, 676 F. App’x. 421 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1348 (mem.) (Mar.
20, 2017) (No. 16-946).
15
Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 676 F. App’x. 421, 427 (6th Cir. 2017).
16
Id.
9
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Dodd-Frank17 and its meaning within the anti-retaliation provision of that
section.18
Whatever the Supreme Court ultimately decides in Digital Realty
Trust,19 the outcome may presage more changes to come for the
whistleblower regulatory scheme and have broader implications for
future judicial review of the interpretation of statutes made by federal
agencies. Some legal commentators and scholars suggest that a decision
in favor of Digital Realty could officially foreclose Dodd-Frank as an
avenue of recovery for whistleblowers who only reported illegal activity
internally to management, and not to the SEC.20 Others predict that
reaffirming the lower court decision in favor of Somers risks
transforming the whistleblower protections under Sarbanes-Oxley, and
other statutes under the jurisdiction of the SEC, into vestigial regulations,
dwarfed by the more attractive legal and monetary incentives of DoddFrank.21 Could the fear of a deluge of Dodd-Frank claims be an
additional justification for ramping up the promulgation of regulatory
limits to Dodd-Frank under the Congressional Review Act,22 and
encourage immediate action by the Senate on the Financial Choice Act
(“FCA”),23 currently pending in Congress and aimed at, among other
things, reducing the number of whistleblower claims under Dodd-Frank?
Perhaps, more far reaching, is whether the Supreme Court’s
forthcoming decision in Digital Realty Trust will be a further indication
of a paradigm shift. The Supreme Court may use Digital Realty Trust to
move away from using a decidedly textualist method of statutory
interpretation and giving deference to agency interpretations of law, á la
Chevron24 and Brand X,25 to resolve the perceived infirmities of
Congressional statutes. In particular, the Supreme Court has frequently

17

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
19
Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017).
20
See, e.g., Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 17, Digital Realty v. Somers, 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017)
(No. 15-17352) 2017 WL 3913767.
21
See, e.g., Brief for the Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, at 5, Digital Realty v. Somers, 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-17352)
2017 WL2391512.
22
Congressional Review Act: Congress Dusts Off Old Oversight Weapon, NAT’L L. REV.
(Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/congressional-review-act-congressdusts-old-oversight-weapon.
23
Financial Choice Act, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 828 (2017).
24
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837
(1984).
25
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Svcs. 545 U.S. 967,
967 (2005).
18
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spurned the Chevron deference framework in several major cases
involving agency statutory interpretations, with some justices adopting a
more limited view of executive agency legislative powers. Indeed,
Justice Neil Gorsuch, the newest addition to the Supreme Court, has
criticized Chevron, as interpreted in Brand X, as “a judge made doctrine
for the abdication of judicial duty.”26
This Article explores the possible impact of the Supreme Court’s
forthcoming decision in Digital Realty Trust. Part II identifies the
statutory provisions at issue and examines how courts have interpreted
the term “whistleblower” under the anti-retaliation provisions of DoddFrank. Part III discusses the issues that will likely be squarely before the
Court in Digital Realty Trust and surveys the broader implications of this
case with respect to whistleblower protections and statutory
interpretation. Part IV examines the potential ramifications of the Digital
Realty Trust decision for whistleblowers and employers, taking into
consideration the potential for future regulatory “reform” aimed at
weakening or eliminating Dodd-Frank. Part V concludes.
II. THE LOWER COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTIONS UNDER DODD- FRANK
A. Whistleblower Protections under Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank
Several years before Dodd-Frank, Congress enacted the SarbanesOxley Act of 200227 in response to a series of major corporate scandals.
The corporate misdeeds of companies such as Enron and WorldCom
arose primarily from the manipulation of financial statements and a lack
of adequate regulatory oversight.28 Sarbanes-Oxley sought to restore
investor confidence and limit the possibility of fraudulent corporate
financial reporting by implementing strict reforms establishing “internal
controls” and mandating heightened financial disclosures.29 The statute’s
provisions also sought to empower whistleblowers to report employer
misconduct internally, or externally to a “federal regulatory or law
enforcement agency,”30 by providing protections against retaliation.
A few years later, Congress was again motivated to pass additional
26

Guitierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
28
Andrew Ceresney, Co-Director of the Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Address at American Law Institute Continuing Legal Education:
Financial Reporting and Accounting Fraud (Sept. 19, 2013).
29
Id.
30
18 U.S.C § 1514A(a)(1)(A).
27
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legislation after the financial crisis of 2008. In 2010, Congress passed
Dodd-Frank31 in response to calls for greater transparency, accountability
and reform in the financial crisis. Comprising 848 pages, Dodd-Frank’s
scope includes sixteen areas of reform, including the Volcker Rule,
creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Financial
Stability and Oversight Council, revised capital and liquidity
requirements for banks and other depository institutions, regulation of
over-the-counter derivatives legislation, and liquidation and the provision
of liquidation authority to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.32
Dodd-Frank did not repeal Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
protections, but instead added new incentives and protections for
whistleblowers.33 To expand regulatory oversight and increase market
stability, Dodd-Frank amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by,
inter alia, adding Section 21F, entitled “Securities Whistleblower
Incentives and Protection.”34 While Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley
each have whistleblower reporting and anti-retaliation provisions, DoddFrank goes beyond the inherent benefits of corporate virtue to incentivize
compliance by providing substantial monetary rewards for individuals
who come forward with original information regarding fraud,
misconduct, or other illegal activity. Those awards are available if a
successful enforcement action results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1
million.35
Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley seek to protect whistleblowers
from various forms of employer retaliation, thereby encouraging such
insiders to come forward with information regarding fraud and securities
violations. However, although Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley share
essentially the same goal, the statutes differ, particularly with respect to
the availability of a private cause of action for employer retaliation, the
length of the statutes of limitations, available remedies and the definition
of whistleblower.
Dodd-Frank provides a private cause of action for anti-retaliation
claims whereby a whistleblower can file a claim directly in federal court,
and allows the SEC to pursue a retaliation claim on behalf of the
whistleblower.36
On the other hand, under Sarbanes-Oxley, a
31

Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Securities and Exchange Commission, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml (last
visited Dec. 27, 2017).
33
OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 2017
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, at 4 (2017).
34
Id.
35
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (b).
36
OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 2017
32
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whistleblower is required to exhaust administrative remedies, by filing an
administrative complaint with the Department of Labor (“DOL”) 37 and
may bring a suit in federal court only if the Secretary of Labor does not
issue a decision within 180 days of filing. 38 In contrast to the 180-day
statute of limitations of Sarbanes-Oxley,39 a Dodd-Frank claim may be
brought six years after the violation occurs, or even as long as ten years
later, depending on the date of discovery of facts material to the claim.40
Furthermore, whereas, Sarbanes-Oxley’s retaliation provision provides
for remedies “necessary to make the employee whole” which includes
reinstatement, back-pay, attorneys’ fees, and special damages for noneconomic harm resulting from the retaliation,41 generally, Dodd-Frank
remedies are limited to compensatory damages. However, in contrast to
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank remedies include double back-pay.42
Apart from the differences in procedure and remedies, there is a
difference between Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank regarding the scope
of protection afforded to whistleblowers. That difference is the subject
of current judicial debate and the focus of this Article. The antiretaliation provision in Sarbanes-Oxley appears to define whistleblower
more broadly than Dodd-Frank, by extending anti-retaliation protections
to both internal and external reporters.43 That is, protection is provided
to an employee who reports or provides information to:
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress;
or
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or
such other person working for the employer who has the
authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct).44
By contrast, Dodd-Frank’s explicit language under subsection
21F(a)(6) defines whistleblower to mean “any individual who provides,
or two or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information
relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission. . .”
(emphasis added).45 However, subsection 21F(h)(A) prohibits retaliatory
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, at 19
(2017).
37
Responsibility for Sarbanes-Oxley complaints was delegated to the Assistant
Secretary for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) and thus the
complaints are received and investigated by OSHA. 67 FR 64272 (Oct. 17, 2002).
38
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1).
39
§ 1514A(b)(2)(D).
40
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii).
41
§ 1514A(c).
42
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C).
43
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
44
§ 1514A(a)(1).
45
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(s)(6).
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actions by employers
against a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act done by the
whistleblower—
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance
with this section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation
or judicial or administrative action of the Commission based
upon
or
related
to
such
information;
or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under
the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.) the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), this
chapter, including section 78j-1(m) of this title, section
1513(e) of Title 18, and any other law, rule,46 or regulation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
Thus, the language in the definition of whistleblower, as set forth in
subsection 21F(a)(6), requires external reporting of securities violations
to the SEC, but the language of 21F(h)(A)(iii) suggests that an individual
may be protected for making disclosures “required or protected” under
Sarbanes-Oxley, the provisions of which extend protection to
whistleblowers who only report internally. The SEC, in a regulation47
and an interpretive release,48 as well as numerous amicus curiae briefs,
has taken the position that internal reporting is protected under DoddFrank’s anti-retaliation provisions. Nonetheless, as discussed below,
there currently exists a divide in the district courts and a split among the
Fifth, Second and Ninth Circuits on this question. The lack of clarity
creates confusion for employers as to potential liability, and for
employees as to the regulatory protections available to them.
Whistleblowers who have only reported the misdeeds of their employers
internally have experienced inconsistent results establishing their claims
under Dodd-Frank.
B. The Circuit Split
Since its enactment, the federal courts have focused on the
inconsistency in Section 21F of Dodd-Frank, with several district courts
pre-Asadi49 attempting to interpret and reconcile the two sections of the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions. Many of those courts, albeit for
reasons different than those ultimately rejected in Asadi, determined that
plaintiffs who have only reported internally are protected under Dodd-

46

§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
17 C.F.R. § 250.21F-2.
48
See Interpretation of the SEC’s Whistleblower Rules Under Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34-75592 (Aug. 4, 2015).
49
Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 620 (5th Cir. 2015).
47
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Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions.50
The district court’s decision in Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., was the
first case that dealt with ambiguities in the Dodd-Frank whistleblower
provisions. In Egan,51 the district court for the Southern District of New
York held that the whistleblower provisions could be harmonized by
reading 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(A)(iii) “as a narrow exception to 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(a)(6)’s definition of a whistleblower as one who reports to the
SEC.”52 Thus, a plaintiff could state a whistleblower claim under DoddFrank either by alleging that he reported to the SEC or “that his
disclosures fell under the four categories of disclosures delineated by
[subsection (iii)] that do not require such reporting: those under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Securities Exchange Act, . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1213
(e), or other laws and regulations subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.”53
Ultimately, the court held that Egan’s disclosures did not fit under any of
these categories, and in particular, not under Sarbanes-Oxley because his
employer was not a publicly traded company.54
In 2011, the SEC attempted to harmonize the provisions of Section
21F of Dodd-Frank by enacting Rule 21F-2,55 which provided separate
definitions of “whistleblower” for the anti-retaliation and awards
provisions. For purposes of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision,
subsection (b) of the rule provides that an individual is a “whistleblower”
if, inter alia, the individual provides information in a manner described
in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (h)(1)(A),”56 whether or not that individual
“satisf[ies] the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an
award.”57 By contrast, the definition of a “whistleblower” who qualifies
for an award requires reporting to the SEC in accordance with the
procedures set forth in other parts of the rule.58 Thus, the SEC clearly
took the position that internal reporters were protected against retaliation
under Dodd-Frank. Nevertheless, the courts remained split on the issue.
i. Asadi
In contrast to several earlier district court decisions, the Fifth Circuit,
50
See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015); see also
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2.
51
Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 LBS, 2011 WL 1672066, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
52
Id. at *5.
53
Id.
54
Id. at *5-7.
55
17 C.F.R. § 240.21 F-2.
56
§ 240.21F-2(b)(ii).
57
§ 240.21F-2(b)(iii).
58
§ 240.21F-2(a).
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in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA),59 held that an insider who only reported
internally was not protected under the anti-retaliation provision of DoddFrank. Asadi, an executive at General Electric Energy, reported
suspected bribery in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
internally, to his supervisor and the company ombudsman.60 In alleged
retaliation, Asadi subsequently received a negative performance review
and was ultimately fired from his position.61 The district court declined
to address the definition of “whistleblower,” choosing instead to dismiss
Asadi’s claim based on the lack of extraterritorial reach of the DoddFrank anti-retaliation provision.62 However, the Fifth Circuit focused on
interpreting the statute using its plain language, eschewing SEC guidance
and the purpose behind the statute itself. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
lower court’s ruling that Asadi was not a whistleblower under DoddFrank, finding that the statutory provisions in question “clearly and
unambiguously”63 defined whistleblower. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
held that the plain language of Dodd-Frank “creates a private cause of
action only for individuals who provide information relating to a violation
of the securities laws to the SEC.”64
In assessing the statutory language, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the statute as written only contemplated one category of whistleblower as
set forth in the definitional section.65 The other three categories refer to
protected activity and did not “define which individuals qualify as
whistleblowers.”66 The Fifth Circuit suggested that this interpretation
flows from the plain language as to prohibited employer activity
pertaining to whistleblowers engaging in any of the three categories of
protected actions.67 Therefore, the statutory language of 15 U.S.C.§ 78u6(h)(1)(A), in the Fifth Circuit’s estimation, is clear and unambiguous
insofar as it answers two questions “(1) who is protected and (2) what
actions by protected individuals constitute protected activity.” 68
The answer to the first question, the Fifth Circuit found, is that the
section protects “whistleblowers,” as defined in the statute.69 As to the
59

730 F.3d 620 (5th Cir 2013)
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, No 12-20522, 2012 WL 2522599 at *1 (S.D. Tex.
June 28, 2012).
61
Id. at *2.
62
Id. at *4-6.
63
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 627 (5th Cir. 2013).
64
Id. at 623.
65
Id. at 625.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 625-26.
68
Id. at 624.
69
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 624.
60
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second question, subsections (i), (ii), and (iii) delineate the protected
activities. That is, subsection (i) protects whistleblowers for the reason
that makes them whistleblowers, i.e., that they have provided information
to the SEC; subsection (ii) protects whistleblowers who participate in an
investigation or proceeding; and subsection (iii) protects whistleblowers
who make disclosures required or protected under any law, rule or
regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC, including SarbanesOxley.70
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the position asserted by Asadi, that
while subsection (iii), by itself, is not ambiguous, it conflicts with the
definition of “whistleblower” by creating a situation where an individual
could engage in the protected activity of the subsection, yet not qualify
as a whistleblower. That result, according to the Fifth Circuit did “not
render [subsection (iii)] conflicting or superfluous.”71
In terms of who is protected, the Fifth Circuit declined to read
subsection (iii) as creating a conflicting definition of whistleblower under
the plain language of subsection (iii). The plain text, according to the
Fifth Circuit, did not demonstrate an intention by the drafters to create
three additional categories of whistleblowers. The Fifth Circuit, in noting
Congress’ use of the term whistleblower throughout the statute, suggested
that, had Congress used the terms “individual” or “employee,” it might
have been swayed otherwise.72
Turning to the canons of statutory construction, the linchpin of
textualist statutory interpretation, the Fifth Circuit determined that the
interaction between the subsections did not make subsection (iii)
superfluous, as it is meant to protect whistleblowers from retaliation, not
based on reporting to the SEC, but from reprisals by the employer arising
from the whistleblower’s required or protected disclosures under
Sarbanes-Oxley and other statutes within the SEC’s jurisdictional
reach.73 The Fifth Circuit posited a situation involving simultaneous
reporting where the whistleblower reports internally and to the SEC.
Retaliation occurs by the employer based on the internal reporting, of
which the employer is aware, and not based on the external report to the
SEC, of which the employer is not aware. In such a situation (which one
might assume happens infrequently), the court suggested that subsection
(iii) provides protection to the whistleblower, because he also reported
externally to the SEC.74
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 625-26.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 626-27.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 627-28.
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In finding the relevant provisions unambiguous, the Fifth Circuit
managed to sidestep the issue of Chevron deference.75 Nonetheless, it
examined the SEC regulations and concluded that those regulations were
“inconsistent.”76 The Fifth Circuit noted that the SEC had adopted a
definition of “whistleblower” which included those who have only
reported internally, while other regulations expressly required that the
original information be reported to the SEC by one of the methods
provided in the regulations.77 The Fifth Circuit also suggested that
extending the definition of whistleblower beyond the plain reading of the
statute risked making the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provision moot.
A whistleblower might, observed the Fifth Circuit, choose Dodd-Frank
over Sarbanes-Oxley, due to the latter’s larger monetary damages awards,
longer statute of limitations and the absence of a requirement for federal
administrative agency exhaustion prior to bringing a claim in court.78
The Fifth Circuit also criticized the SEC for administrative agency
overreach for not actually clarifying or interpreting the plain text of the
Dodd-Frank provisions in question, but rather, redefining and broadening
the definition of whistleblower to essentially read “to the commission”
out of the definition.79 Thereby, the SEC sought to provide Dodd-Frank
protection to an individual even if he “never reports any information to
the SEC, so long as he has undertaken the activity listed,80 and eliminated
what the Fifth Circuit viewed as a significant distinction between DoddFrank and Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provisions.
ii. Berman
The Southern District of New York, in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy,
LLC, followed the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Asadi. In Berman, the
Southern District of New York adhered to the Fifth Circuit’s plain
meaning interpretation of the provision to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for
failure to “adequately allege that he is a whistleblower within the
meaning of Dodd-Frank.”81 Berman, an accountant, sued his employer
for retaliation under Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley, when he was fired
after reporting improper accounting practices to his employer. On appeal,
the Second Circuit, rejecting the lower court’s reasoning, determined that
Berman was indeed a whistleblower entitled to protection under the anti75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 629-30.
Id. at 629.
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Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 404, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank. Consequently, the Second
Circuit’s decision on this issue created a circuit split.82
The Second Circuit, although largely relying on the Supreme
Court’s decision in King v. Burwell,83 did not address the plain meaning
of the statutory provisions, opting instead to frame the issue as whether
“the arguable tension” between the definitional section and subsection
(iii) of the anti-retaliation provision “creates sufficient ambiguity as to
the coverage of subdivision (iii) to oblige us to give Chevron deference
to the SEC rule.”84
Although finding no “direct” conflict between the SEC notification
requirement in the definition of whistleblower and subsection (iii), the
Second Circuit was still critical of the Fifth Circuit’s harmonization of
the provisions in Asadi. The Second Circuit found that the example in
Asadi, of simultaneous reporting, even if plausible, failed to fully redress
the issue, leaving an “unresolved tension” between the provisions.85
Moreover, the Second Circuit found that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation
would give subdivision (iii) a very limited scope since few
whistleblowers would likely engage in simultaneous reporting and some
potential whistleblowers—particularly auditors and attorneys who are
expressly and impliedly referenced in (iii)—were bound by statute and
ethical duties to make reports of employer misconduct internally in the
first instance.86
The Second Circuit, similar to the Fifth Circuit, rejected the
superfluous argument, but placed the blame on the process itself in which
bills in Congress are sometimes hastily put together without proper
reconciliation of all of the inherent parts.87 According to the Second
Circuit in Berman, under these circumstances, where the text is unclear
and given the “tension” between the statute’s provisions, Chevron
deference to the SEC’s interpretation of the statute is warranted.88 Thus,
Berman was entitled to pursue Dodd-Frank remedies despite not having
reported to the SEC prior to his termination.
Not so, said Judge Jacobs, who in a scathing dissent to Berman’s
majority opinion, sided with the Fifth Circuit in Asadi. Judge Jacobs
found no support for the majority’s application of Chevron deference
simply because “a plain reading of a statutory provision gives it an
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015).
King v. Burwell 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2480 (2015).
Berman, 801 F.3d at 148.
Id. at 151.
Id.
Id. at 154-55.
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extremely limited effect.”89 The dissent admonished the majority for
straying beyond their judicial authority and their obligation “to apply
congressional statutes as written.”90 The dissent noted that the majority
opinion did very little to address the plain meaning of the statute. Judge
Jacobs accused the majority of judicial overreaching by deferring to the
SEC’s interpretation of the provision, which interpreted “to the
commission” out of the statute91 and inserted the more general term
“employee,” where Dodd-Frank expressly refers to “whistleblowers.”92
In finding that administrative deference was appropriate, the majority
relied only on the first prong of Chevron, requiring a finding of
ambiguity. The majority’s finding of “arguable tension” is based on the
conclusion that the natural reading of the statutory text would leave 15
U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) with “extremely limited scope. In Judge
Jacob’s view, however, a plain reading of the provisions together, which
creates a limited scope of protection, does not, in and of itself, indicate
ambiguity.93
Judge Jacobs asserted that, beyond its finding of ambiguity, the
majority failed to acknowledge that Congress could have intentionally
placed limitations on the reach of Dodd-Frank, through the definitional
section, one means for “limiting the meaning of statutory text.” 94 By
implication, what appears to the majority to be statutory infirmity brought
about by Congressional ineptitude in providing “little, if any” protections
to lawyers and auditors who report violations, may have been an
intentional determination by Congress to provide no additional incentives
for such actors to meet their professional and ethical obligations.95
Further, Judge Jacobs noted that the U.S. Code is replete with statutes and
provisions that have an “extremely limited” effect.96
Lastly, and perhaps most relevant to the Supreme Court’s future
decision in Digital Realty, is the dissent’s discussion of the majority’s
overreliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in King v. Burwell97 to
incorrectly support the majority’s decision to eschew a textualist inquiry
into the plain meaning in favor of a purposive interpretation. The dissent
argued that Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO,98 which was decided ten days
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
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Id. at 158.
Berman, 801 F.3d at 155.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 157-58.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 159.
Berman, 801 F.3d at 158-59.
King v. Burwell 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2480 (2015).
Baker Botts LLP, v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2158 (2015).
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before King v. Burwell, is a continuation of the Supreme Court’s
textualist statutory interpretation jurisprudence.99 Thus, the dissent
argued, the result in King v. Burwell, which resulted from the “unusual
circumstances” of the case, does not support a paradigm shift away from
an examination of the plain statutory text.100 Although a plain reading of
the text leads to the exclusion of whistleblowers who only report
internally from Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection, according to
Judge Jacobs, this is not an untenable result, because those very same
whistleblowers would have Sarbanes-Oxley protection.101 Further, the
dissent points out the irony in King v. Burwell, in which the Supreme
Court noted that, if Congress intended a limitation, they would have done
so in the definitional section, suggesting that this is the case in Berman.102
After initially seeking a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court,
Neo@Ogilvy, LLC, decided that it would not pursue higher review.103
iii. Digital Realty Trust
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Somers v. Digital Realty Trust104
deepened the split between the circuit courts. On June 26, 2017, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Somers v. Digital Realty Trust105 in
a move lauded by many because of the likelihood that the decision will
provide much needed clarification on a significant issue under the DoddFrank whistleblower scheme.
Somers, employed as a Vice President by Digital Realty, alleged,
among other claims, that he was dismissed from his position, in violation
of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions, for making internal reports
of securities misdeeds by his employer. The Northern District of
California denied Digital Realty’s motion to dismiss Somers’ DoddFrank whistleblower claim, on the ground that SEC Rule 21F-2(b)(1) was
entitled to Chevron deference.106
The Northern District of California, adopting a textualist approach,
found the statute was ambiguous by examining both the overall structure
and the specific context in which the language of the subsections are used,
paying particular attention to the application of the surplusage and
99
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harmonious-reading interpretive canons. The Northern District of
California concluded the whistleblower definition would render
subsection (iii) superfluous because portions of subsection (iii), such as
those relevant to attorneys and auditors, contemplate internal reporting
and exhaustion of internal compliance procedures before any external
reporting.107 Moreover, the application of the whistleblower definition to
the anti-retaliation provision would also make the “to the commission”
language in (i) and (ii) superfluous because, under a narrow reading, the
only person who can be a whistleblower is someone who reports “to the
commission.”108
The Northern District of California also supported the ambiguity of
the provisions because “different usage can have different meanings,” to
wit, (i) and (ii) make reference “to the commission,” whereas, the lack of
such language in (iii) may be indicative of Congressional intent not to
require SEC reporting in that particular subsection.109 The Northern
District of California, faced with what it determined to be two
“reasonable” interpretations of the interplay between the statutes, found
sufficient ambiguity to satisfy step one of Chevron.110
Moving on to step two of Chevron, the Northern District of
California determined that the application of the SEC’s clarifying
regulation was permissible. On the one hand, the lack of legislative
history in connection with subsection (iii), combined with the fact that it
was a last minute addition to the provision, according to the court,
reflected Congressional intent to expand the scope of the section, which,
prior to subsection (iii), unambiguously required external reporting to the
SEC.111 On the other hand, there was no indication of legislative history
suggesting that Congress “purposefully” sought to limit the Dodd-Frank
anti-retaliation protections to whistleblowers who only report externally
to the SEC.112 Not surprisingly, given the fact that most other courts that
have reached this step of the test have concluded that SEC Rule 21-F2(b)(i) was a “reasonable” construction of the statute, the district court
found that step two of Chevron had been satisfied.
The Ninth Circuit, hearing the case on interlocutory appeal, ruled, in
a 2-1 decision, that the term “whistleblower” extends protection to
employees making internal disclosures of alleged unlawful activity, and
does not limit protection under Dodd-Frank to employees reporting
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id. at 1100-02.
Id. at 1102-03.
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Id. at 1104-05.
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potential violations to the SEC.113 The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the
lower court’s analysis and decision, ultimately agreeing that deference to
the SEC’s interpretation was warranted. While clearly noting a lack of
legislative history concerning subsection (iii), the court nonetheless
determined that the language of the provision “illuminate[d]
Congressional intent” to bar retaliation under Dodd-Frank against
employees reporting internally under Sarbanes-Oxley.114 In the absence
of such protection, brought about by a narrow reading of subsection (iii),
the court concluded, employees who are required to report internally,
such as attorneys and auditors, would have no protection between the
period of internal reporting and reporting to the Commission.115
The Ninth Circuit shifted its attention to a broader question: the
appropriate application of definitions to statutes. In other words, whether
a definition imports its meaning to the entire statute or is subject to change
based on the context. Drawing upon the Supreme Court’s decision in
King v. Burwell,116 the Ninth Circuit, adopting reasoning similar to the
Second Circuit, determined that the definitional subsection of DoddFrank was not dispositive of the statute’s scope.117 The Ninth Circuit
cited King v. Burwell for the proposition that the use of a term in one part
of a statute “may mean a different thing” in a different part of the statute
depending on the context.118 The Ninth Circuit further stated that a
narrow reading of Dodd-Frank does not make “practical sense and
undercut[s] Congressional intent.”119
The Ninth Circuit, in agreement with the Berman court, implicitly
rejected Asadi’s simultaneous-reporting hypothetical.120 The Ninth
Circuit pointed out that such a reading would reduce subsection (iii) to
the “point of absurdity,” providing protection only to whistleblowers who
simultaneously report possible securities violations both internally and
externally, and the employer, without knowledge of the SEC report, fires
the employee on the basis of the knowledge of the internal report.121
According to the Ninth Circuit, without knowledge of the report to the
SEC, the whistleblower would not be able to satisfy the causality required
between knowledge of the SEC report and the alleged retaliation in
113
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response. The Court also rejected the arguments made by Digital Realty
Trust (and the court in Asadi) that a narrow reading of the provision
would moot the anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank.122
Having determined that the invocation of Chevron deference was
appropriate, the Ninth Circuit then turned to the seventy-four page amicus
curiae brief submitted by the SEC, which asserted, based on limited
evidence, that some whistleblowers, who prefer a different process from
Dodd-Frank, would still file claims under Sarbanes-Oxley.123 The Ninth
Circuit also suggested that the ease of adjudication with the DOL leading
the investigation, as well as the availability of special damages, might
make the enforcement mechanism under Sarbanes-Oxley preferable to
that of Dodd-Frank.124
iv. Other Decisions
Subsequent to the split between the Fifth, Second, and Ninth
Circuits, the issue of the statutory interpretation of the whistleblower
provisions has arisen in other circuit courts. In Verble v. Morgan Stanley
Smith Barney LLC, the district court held that the employee was not a
whistleblower because he failed to report to the SEC.125 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower
claim, but did so without reaching the question of the statutory
ambiguity.126 Instead, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the claim based on the
failure to state a “plausible claim” for relief.127 In March 2017, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the former Morgan Stanley
employee’s claims that he was entitled to whistleblower protection,
despite his failure to report his complaints to the SEC.128
In 2015, in Duke v. Prestige Cruises Int’l, Inc.,129 the district court
ruled that an employee who was discharged after reporting fraud
internally, but not to the SEC, did not have a valid claim under DoddFrank’s anti-retaliation provision.130 The district court dismissed the
employee’s Dodd-Frank claim with prejudice, but the Eleventh Circuit
stayed the plaintiff’s appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in
122

Id. at 1050.
Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae in Support of the
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Digital Realty.131
In April 2017, the Third Circuit, in Danon v. Vanguard Group, took
up the Dodd-Frank retaliation claim of a tax lawyer who reported various
violations of tax and corporate laws to his employers.132 The district court
originally dismissed the case for failure to adequately plead sufficient
facts indicating a causal connection between the employer’s knowledge
and the employee’s termination.133 The Third Circuit ultimately
remanded the case, allowing the Dodd-Frank claim to go forward.134
Before making its decision, the district court will likely wait for the
Supreme Court’s decision in the Digital Realty case.
III. THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Digital Realty will likely depend
on how it chooses to resolve the apparent tension between the DoddFrank provisions, given the lack of certainty with respect to the Court’s
preferred method of statutory interpretation and the future of Chevron
deference. While petitioner Digital Realty asserts this case poses “a
simple question of statutory interpretation,”135 this is not necessarily the
case as the Court must resolve once and for all, the complexities of its
role as the “interpreter in chief” of Congressional legislation. More
broadly, for the Court to reach a decision in Digital Realty, a renewed
examination of the debate regarding the textualist versus purposivist
theories of legislative interpretation is likely unavoidable.
Foregoing the “traditional” textualist statutory analysis, the Second
and Ninth Circuits relied heavily on King v. Burwell, a case in which the
Supreme Court justified giving Congressional purpose primacy over
canonical statutory interpretation.136 To reach its decision in Digital
Realty, the Supreme Court will no doubt be forced to resolve some of the
issues left open by King v. Burwell. Therefore, part of the Supreme
Court’s analysis of Digital Realty will opine on the scope of the doctrine
of administrative deference under Chevron137 and as modified by Brand
X138 which, while often cited, is applied inconsistently. For example, a
131
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study conducted by Professor William Eskridge, Jr. revealed that the
courts often do not apply deference in cases where Chevron should
apply.139 In addition, the justices will likely be compelled to assert (or
reassert) the appropriate role that the Supreme Court should play with
respect to statutory interpretation in the absence of a clear expression of
Congressional intent. Until the case is heard, however, questions remain
as to how the Court will decide Digital Realty and what potential impact
this decision will have on future whistleblowers?
A. Textualism and the Roberts Court
Although reputedly textualist, the current Supreme Court led by
Chief Justice John Roberts, has recently decided cases based on a line of
reasoning that suggests a shift in its method of statutory interpretation.
Arguably, in cases, such as Bond v. United States,140 Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA,141 Yates v. United States,142 and King v.
Burwell,143 the Supreme Court’s analysis focused on the purpose of the
statute and Congress’s overarching intent, in order to resolve issues
concerning statutory meaning. This contrasts with the Supreme Court’s
former diligent parsing and application of canonical precepts to the
statute’s text. Notably, the courts in Berman and Digital Realty relied on
King v. Burwell for this very sentiment—that Congressional purpose
trumps plain meaning.144
In King, the Supreme Court grappled with an interpretive issue
regarding whether, under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), tax credits
are available in states that have a federal exchange rather than a state
exchange.145 The ACA requires the creation of an insurance “exchange”
in each state and indicates that the exchange may be established by the
state or, in the event the state chooses not to do so, by the federal
government.146 The ACA also provides, pursuant to the Internal Revenue
Code, that tax credits be provided to certain individuals enrolled in “an
unless prior precedent held the statute unambiguous).
139
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L. J.
1083, 1090 (2008); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a
Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1740 (2010).
140
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exchange established by the state to help subsidize the cost” of health
insurance.147 A subsequent Internal Revenue Service regulation
interpreted “exchange established by the state” to mean that tax credits
are available to individuals participating in exchanges in states that have
either a state or federally established and operated exchange.148
In King, the Court conceded the plain meaning of the statute would
in the “natural sense” indicate that an exchange created by the state does
not include exchanges established by the federal government.149
However, it declined to apply that meaning.150 Moreover, the Court
recognized ambiguity in the phrase “established by the state,” step one
under a Chevron analysis, but refused to apply Chevron, deciding instead
that it could not have been Congress’s intention to “assign a question of
deep economic and political significance” to an agency, such as the IRS,
which has no expertise in “crafting health care insurance.”151 Further, the
Court asserted that if Congress had in fact had this intention, it would
have expressly stated so.152 Ultimately, the Court’s decision in King
rested not on an interpretation of the text or administrative agency
deference, but on the legislative purpose of the statute.153
Not surprisingly, the decision in King is not without its critics.
Dissenters in King, Berman, and Digital Reality, for their part, make
decidedly similar arguments. Each point out the inadequacies of the
majority’s statutory interpretation,154 and, in the case of Digital Realty,
warns the Ninth Circuit of the danger in relying too heavily on King v.
Burwell.155
Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the dissenting opinion in King. In
his unabashedly textualist and originalist fashion, Justice Scalia, joined
by Justices Thomas and Alito, castigated the majority for attempting to
save the Affordable Care Act at the expense of a “natural reading” of the
statute.156 Ultimately, Justice Scalia questioned whether the judicial
branch should serve the role of assisting Congress in rewriting legislation
147
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when it encounters statutes that the courts themselves describe as
examples of “inartful drafting”157 and products of a lack of oversight.158
In Justice Scalia’s view, if one is to perceive Congress as a competent
branch of government that is capable of writing coherent legislation, the
legislature should be taken at its word.159 The judiciary can assume such
legislation “means what it looks to mean” and to the extent it does not, it
should be sent back to Congress for revision.160 It is “not the Court’s
“place to judge the quality of the care and deliberation” that goes into a
law as it is binding on the court just the same.161 Furthermore, “much
less is it [the Court’s] place to make everything come out right when
Congress does not do its job properly.”162 However, if such statements
are taken as true, then what role, if any, is there for the courts to play in
fixing legislation that Congress has expressed imperfectly?
One solution is for Congress to pass legislation revising judicial
opinions. In October 2017, in the latest attempt to reform the healthinsurance market, President Donald Trump, through executive order,
eliminated the subsidies on both state and federal exchanges, thereby
mooting the key issue in King v. Burwell. Nonetheless, the issues of
statutory interpretation presented in King remain relevant for the
Supreme Court to address. To wit, it will need to clarify whether the King
decision was intended to be a special case, a proverbial “one-off,” or an
indication of an ideological shift.
To be sure, the Supreme Court’s broad application of its reasoning
in King to Digital Realty would run counter to Digital Reality’s
arguments. In its brief, Digital Realty argued that the Ninth Circuit’s
decision was inconsistent with the plain text of the Dodd-Frank Act, as
well as its structure and history. 163 Digital Realty asserted that the
decision violated a foundational principle of statutory interpretation, that,
“where a statute includes an express definition of a term, courts and
agencies may not invent a different definition.”164 However, in King, this
is exactly what the Supreme Court did.165 In support of Digital Realty,
the amicus briefs coalesced around Digital Realty’s argument that the
plain meaning of the anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank only
157
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protects whistleblowers who report externally to the SEC.166
On the other hand, the adoption of a purely textualist interpretation
of the provision, similar to Asadi, would favor a narrow reading of DoddFrank’s anti-retaliation provision. Such an interpretation would foreclose
protections under Dodd-Frank for internal whistleblowers who do not
report to the SEC and could signal a return to the Supreme Court’s
textualist roots. Either way, the Supreme Court in Digital Reality must
consider, with respect to separation of powers, whether Chevron
deference should give executive agencies the final say in the
interpretation of legislation.
B. Chevron is Dead! Long Live Chevron!
Digital Realty provides yet another opportunity for the Supreme
Court to address the elephant in the room,”167 administrative deference
under Chevron. The Supreme Court will be compelled to address the
scope and meaning of Chevron’s framework. The 1984 decision might
be ripe for reconsideration, especially in light of the Court’s recent
addition of Justice Neil Gorsuch, one of the doctrines most vocal and
prolific critics. Is Chevron a judicial mandate or a precedent that serves
as a justification for the abdication of judicial responsibility? Clearly,
Chevron is “strong medicine . . . requir[ing] courts to accept any agency
interpretation that is reasonable, even if it is not the interpretation that the
court finds most plausible.”168 If Chevron was ever once considered a
core principle of administrative law,169 it is no longer settled judicial
doctrine.
Under the modern judicial regime, a court may or may not invoke
Chevron deference. The notion that a reviewing court must defer to a
federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that an
agency administers has been criticized as undermining judicial review.
166
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Such deference is said to deprive the courts of the role of the final arbiter
of what a statute means and to threaten the separation of powers by
allowing the executive branch to redraft and construe federal statutes, and
promote the exercise of “delegated legislative policymaking authority in
what looks like a judicial proceeding.”170
The Supreme Court, when facing an interpretive issue, has, in some
cases, done an end run around Chevron either by creating an exception,
finding no ambiguity or applying a purposive interpretive methodology.
The Ninth Circuit, in reaching its decision in Digital Realty, relied on the
SEC’s 2015 published interpretation of the anti-retaliation provisions, in
which the SEC stated:
[I]f read in isolation Rule 21F-9(a) could be construed to
require that an individual must report to the Commission
before he or she will qualify as a whistleblower eligible for
the employment retaliation protections provided by Section
21F, that construction is not consistent with Rule 21F-2 and
would undermine our overall
goals in implementing the
whistleblower program171 . . . [W]e are issuing this
interpretation to clarify that, for purposes of Section 21F’s
employment retaliation protections, an individual’s status as
a whistleblower does not depend on adherence
to the
reporting procedures specified in Rule 21F-9(a).172
According to the SEC’s broader interpretation, whistleblowers can sue
under the Dodd-Frank Act even if they did not report directly to the
SEC.173 Therefore, the application of Chevron deference would result in
protection under subsection (iii) for both internal and external
whistleblowers.
The Supreme Court’s composition will determine the future of
Chevron. While Justice Roberts and Kennedy have acted as the swing
votes in a number of major cases triggering Chevron deference, Justices
Thomas and Alito have historically spurned the idea of Chevron
deference.174 At its inception, Justice Scalia defended the Chevron
doctrine as an accurate reflection of Congressional intent, recognizing the
need for deference to agency expertise.”175 However, Justice Scalia’s
later opinions, such as King v. Burwell, suggest a recognition that the
application of the Chevron doctrine can raise concerns as to the
170
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separation of powers. To this point, Justice Gorsuch, who was presumed
to fill the textualist and Constitutionalist role left open by the death of
Justice Scalia, is decidedly anti-Chevron.
Justice Gorsuch has made it clear that he is vehemently opposed to
Chevron. In his confirmation hearings, when questioned about Chevron
deference, Justice Gorsuch clearly expressed his due process and
separation of powers concerns with respect to Chevron and expressed
what he perceived as the dangers of placing bureaucracies above “neutral,
dispassionate judges.”176 Writing from the bench of the Tenth Circuit in
Guitierrrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, for example, Justice Gorsuch not only
authored the majority opinion, but provided a nine-page concurrence in
which he urged a reconsideration of Chevron and Brand X by the
Supreme Court.177 In his view, these decisions “permit executive
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative
power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a
little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.
Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.”178
It is also unclear what Justice Gorsuch’s role will be on the Court,
having aligned himself to the right of most of his colleagues and
exhibiting a tendency to issue independent opinions, as opposed to
joining with the Court, much to the dismay of Chief Justice Roberts.179
Justice Gorsuch’s views regarding Chevron and the role he plays on the
Roberts Court will likely have significant implications for the decision in
Digital Realty. This is especially likely if Justice Gorsuch is able to sway
the other Justices, some of whom are already questioning the continuing
viability of Chevron deference.
The Regulatory Accountability Act (“RAA”)180 that is on the floor
of the House of Representatives and currently pending in the Senate, is
another threat to Chevron. In as much as Chevron may be blamed for the
creation of a large and expensive administrative state, antithetical to the
Republican Party’s proposed goal of widespread national deregulation,
the RAA could potentially eliminate Chevron deference. Under the
RAA, courts are required to “decide de novo all relevant questions of law,
including the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, and
176
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rules made by agencies.”181 In the event a court finds a gap or ambiguity
in the statute, the court “shall not interpret or rely on that gap or ambiguity
as: (1) an implicit delegation to the agency of legislative rulemaking
authority, or (2) a justification for interpreting agency authority
expansively or for deferring to the agency’s interpretation on the question
of law.”182
IV. IMPACT ON EMPLOYERS AND FUTURE WHISTLEBLOWERS
The Court’s decision in Digital Realty will have significant
implications for employers and potential whistleblowers. For employers,
a decision by the Supreme Court to expand the definition of
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank to include internal reporters could
potentially leave them vulnerable to Dodd-Frank claims long after the
employee has separated from the company due to Dodd-Frank’s longer
six to ten-year statute of limitations. Unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
which requires an exhaustion of administrative remedies before bringing
a claim in federal court, Dodd-Frank’s private right of action allows
claims that might not have otherwise gone to court to be brought in
federal court. Of course, while this should mean increased protections
under Dodd-Frank for whistleblowers who report internally, some
suggest that this could also have a negative impact on the virility of
corporate compliance programs, and in turn, the protections available to
internal whistleblowers under those programs.
Corporate compliance programs, required for publicly traded
companies under Sarbanes-Oxley, are an important part of a larger
regulatory scheme, put in place to curb wrongdoing of employees,
managers and officers by increasing oversight and accountability through
the implementation of a series of internal controls. While there are
obvious benefits for employees seeking Dodd-Frank anti-relation
protections after choosing to report employer misconduct through
corporate compliance programs, the refusal of companies to protect their
internal whistleblowers from retaliation is essentially an attack on the
legitimacy and authority of their own internal reporting systems, in an
effort to stave off Dodd-Frank claims. Cases like Asadi and other legal
precedents could further incentivize whistleblowers to skip the internal
compliance program altogether and instead report directly to the SEC.
If the Supreme Court decides the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation
provisions do not extend protection to internal whistleblowers, it could
have a devastating impact on those employees who have lost their jobs as
181
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a result of reporting misconduct to managers and relied on Dodd-Frank’s
longer statute of limitations. Whistleblowers with cases pending prior to
the Digital Realty decision would likely be dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action. However, regardless of the Supreme Court’s
determination concerning Dodd-Frank, potential whistleblowers who are
either required to or choose to report internally may still have a viable
claim against adverse employment actions under Sarbanes-Oxley’s antiretaliation provisions.
Finally, the expansion of the definition of whistleblower could
impact the future of Dodd-Frank. Recently, the House of Representatives
passed the Financial Choice Act (“FCA”).183 The FCA’s provisions seek,
among other things, a reduction in the number of whistleblowers eligible
to receive awards for reporting employer misconduct to the SEC by
preventing whistleblowers involved in any wrongdoing from collecting
awards.184 Dodd-Frank currently prevents whistleblowers convicted of
criminal conduct related to the reported fraud from collecting
whistleblower awards. Although, the FCA is still pending before the
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committees, it has been
viewed by some as the initial shot across the bow towards Dodd-Frank’s
repeal. And while the SEC has vowed to continue to implement the
whistleblower incentive act, a veritable run on whistleblower claims
could be just the impetus to spur additional immediate efforts towards the
repeal of Dodd-Frank.
V. CONCLUSION
The complexities of Digital Realty will require the Supreme Court
to revisit a number of issues that may have initially been thought of as
firmly decided. The Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision in Digital
Realty will potentially provide guidance for employers and
whistleblowers, but there could be much further reaching implications for
both sides no matter how the Court rules. In addition, there is uncertainty
surrounding how the current Republican administration, which has
expressed a desire to eliminate Dodd-Frank, has committed to rolling
back Obama era legislation, and has taken steps toward deregulation in a
number of areas, will alter the Supreme Court’s decision. Currently, it
cannot be said with any degree of certainty how the Supreme Court will
decide Digital Realty or what the potential effect of the decision will be
on whistleblower provisions in other U.S. statutes or legislation in other
countries. At least for the time being however, while Dodd-Frank may
183
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not be the picture of clarity, the most cogent advice for employers is
simple—do not retaliate against whistleblowers!

